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ABSTRACT 
The term corporate governance has been defined in the broad sense and 
is also referred to as the process through which shareholders induce 
management to act in their interest A nominee director is usually appointed 
by the nominators to sit on the board of directors of a company to represent 
their interests. These nominators are usually the major shareholders or a 
class of shareholders or the creditors. Nominee directors are commonly 
found in companies such as in corporate groups, joint ventures and 
government-linked companies. It is a trite law that the board of directors 
act in the best interest of the company. A nominee director, in discharging 
his or her duties to the company will face the dual loyalty. Firstly is his or 
her loyalty to the nominators who have nominated him or her to represent 
their interest in the company. Secondly is the nominee director s duty to the 
company. Hence, the nominee director is in a delicate position in discharging 
his or her duty. Section 132(1E) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965, 
stipulates the position of the nominee director under the strict approach 
that is to act in the best interest of the company and shall not subordinate 
the interest of the company to his or her nominators. Malaysian corporate 
ownership is in the concentrated category and the position of nominee 
directors is common. Companies in Malaysia are required to adhere to 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012. This paper aims to 
provide clearly the position of the nominee director as the gatekeeper and 
will assist the corporate regulators to improve and promote good corporate 
governance practice in the Malaysian corporate landscape. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Nominee Directors, Gatekeeper, 
Conflict of Interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A nominee director is usually appointed to the board of directors of a 
company to represent the interests of a specific group or class of persons 
such as a class of shareholders, a major creditor to the company or an 
employee group. In Levin v Clark, Jacobs J. noted that: 
It is not uncommon for a director to be appointed to a board of 
directors in order to represent an interest outside the company: a 
mortgagee or other trader or a particular shareholder. 
It may be in the interests of the company that there be upon its 
board of directors one who will represent these other interests and 
who will be acting solely in the interests of such a party and who 
may in that way be properly regarded as acting in the interests of 
the company as a whole flj. 
It is common for the class of shareholders, debenture holders or a 
major creditor to have authority in the company by way of either an express 
provision in the company's Articles or in a supplementary agreement such as 
a shareholders' agreement, to appoint or remove a director. In a corporate 
group structure, it is common for the parent company to appoint nominee 
directors for its subsidiary companies. 
The definition of corporate governance under the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 2012 [2] provides that: 
The process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realising 
long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests 
of other stakeholders. 
Section 132( 1E) Malaysian Companies Act (C A) 1965 was the result of 
the Companies Amendment Act 2007 which codified the 'Responsibility of 
the nominee director' [3]. This further affirmed that the board of directors, 
especially the nominee director of a company is also in the position as a 
gatekeeper. This is because in the corporate context, directors and officers 
of a company are in a fiduciary relationship to the company. 
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Coffee Jr [4] is of the view that a gatekeeper within the corporate 
context means an independent professional who plays one of two distinct 
roles which tend to overlap in practice. Firstly, the gatekeeper may be a 
professional who is positioned so as to be able to prevent wrongdoing by 
withholding necessary cooperation or consent. For example, an investment 
banking firm can refuse to underwrite the issuer's securities if it finds that 
the issuer's disclosures are materially deficient, Secondly and the superior 
definition of a gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational intermediary 
to assure investors as to the quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate 
issuer. 
In certain circumstances, nominee directors face difficulties when a 
conflict of interest and duty arises between the company on whose board they 
sit and the person who appointed them to the board. They are also subject 
to the duty not to fetter discretion. Thus, it can be seen that the nominee 
directors would be in a dilemma. In some common law jurisdictions, 
the nominee directors are relieved of the full force of the common law 
obligations when they are representing the interests of their appointor. 
However, a relaxation of the nominee director's duties is accompanied 
by identification of the conditions that must be fulfilled before such relaxation 
takes effect, together with legal liability imposed on the nominator. 
WHO IS A NOMINEE DIRECTOR? 
The term nominee director is often used to describe a person who has 
been appointed as a director to represent the interests of a particular group 
of shareholders or class of shareholders. Under other circumstances, the 
appointment of the nominee director is to represent the interests of a group 
of employees, a lender or debenture holder or a participant in a corporate 
joint venture. 
The phrase 'nominee director' has no legal definition.The term 
'nominee director' is accepted as referring to individuals who are 
'independent of the method of their appointment, in the performance of 
their office, act in accordance with some understanding, arrangement or 
status which gives rise to an obligation to the appointor' [5]. 
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Anominee director is at law, a de jure director [6]. Keay [7] states that 
companies might have nominee directors, who are de jure directors owing 
their appointment due to some third person, often a member or members 
of the company who hold a strong position in relation to company affairs. 
This arrangement must be permitted by the articles of association. Ahern [8] 
opined that a nominee director is simply a species of the de jure director. 
However, a nominee director differs from a '"normal" director in the sense 
that nominee directors were appointed at the behest of a third party rather 
than the company they serve. These directors may also be appointed by 
those holding a significant share interest in the company who had been 
given a contractual right [9], an expectation [10] or a right conferred by the 
company's articles [11] to appoint a director to the board [12]. 
As of 15 August, 2007, the Companies Act (Amendment) 2007, 
came into force and introduced the statutory provision on the duties and 
liabilities of company directors. Inter alia, by virtue of s. 132 (IE), provides 
the responsibilities of a nominee director [13]. 
A director, who was appointed by virtue of his position as 
an employee of a company, or who was appointed by or as a 
representative of a shareholder, employer or debenture holder, 
shall act in the best interest of the company and in the event of any 
conflict between his duty to act in the best interest of the company 
and his duty to his nominator, he shall not subordinate his duty to 
act in the best interest of the company to his duty to his nominator. 
Section 132(1E) CA1965 demonstrates the 'special' status of nominee 
directors being recognised in the corporate board of directors and still treats 
the nominee director's liability similar to that of other directors. 
THE CHALLENGES FACED BY NOMINEE DIRECTORS 
In discharging the duty as nominee diectors, the dual loyalty owed by the 
nominee directors which was an issue peculiar to their fiduciary duties 
to the company as well as to their nominators. Austin [14] observed that 
'some of the problems about nominee directorships are theoretical legal 
problems about the nature of fiduciary duties. In particular, can a director 
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accept a duty of loyalty to a nominator bearing in mind his or her duty to 
act in good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole? When an actual 
conflict arises between the director's duty to the nominator and the duty 
to the company, is the director ever free to prefer the former to the latter?' 
Such questions seem important because they imply tension between legal 
principle and commercial reality. 
Ford et. al. [15] stated that there is a longstanding debate about the 
fiduciary duties of'nominee' directors. These learned corporate law authors 
raised the issue, "when a director is appointed to the board to serve the 
interests of an identified appointor, is the director entitled to act as nominee 
of the appointor in disregard of his or her fiduciary duties as a director?"[ 16]. 
They explained that the answer to this question depends on a close analysis 
of the arrangements between the director, the appointor and the company. 
Rachagan et. al. [17] described these challenges in reconciling the 
nominee's duty to the appointor with the corresponding fiduciary duty to 
act bona fide in the interests of the company as difficult. Aptly described 
by Lipton et. al. [18], the fiduciary and statutory duty to act good in the 
interests of the company as a whole requires directors to act in the best 
interests of the shareholders as a collective group. However, difficulties arise 
in situations where a nominee director is appointed to represent the interests 
of particular persons. In such cases, there may be problems reconciling 
the nominee's duty to act in the interests of those who appointed him or 
her and the duty to act in the interests of the company as a whole. In view 
of the rather serious consequences of breach of fiduciary duties, nominee 
directors are in an unenviable predicament when the time comes to make 
decisions and to choose a course of action [19]. 
CONCLUSION: NOMINEE DIRECTOR AS THE 
GATEKEEPER 
Crutchfield identified that case law has adopted a strict view of nominee 
directors. The strict view was laid down in the English decisions [20] and 
adopted by Street J (as he then was) in Bennetts [21] is that once directors 
take their positions on the board they must act only in the interests of the 
company as a whole considering the interests of the members as a collective 
group in preference always to the wishes of their appointors. 
97 
SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH JOURNAL 
Crutchfield [22] illustrates that the strict approach as irreconcilable 
with commercial reality, given that it is both unrealistic and unreasonable 
not to acknowledge that a nominee director shall always govern with his 
appointor's interests at heart whether or not his appointor's interests coincide 
with the best interests of the company. Crutchfield [23] further states that if 
this is the law, it imposes a standard which makes the position of nominee 
directors impossible. It ignores the commercial reality of the appointment 
of the nominee directors and the reality that in making their decisions 
they will often have regard to the interest and act upon the wishes of their 
appointors. Crutchfield further contend that the strict approach apart from 
lacking commercial realism, such a blanket prohibition also amounts to a 
lack of faith in equity's ability to apply its principles flexibly to the facts 
of a particular case [24]. 
He further stated that there are also cases that have allowed regard to be 
had in the interest of the appointor provided that this is in the best interests 
of the company. This view was derived from the case of Re: Broadcasting 
Station 2GB Ltd (1965). [25] Under this view the nominee directors are 
allowed to have regard to the interests of the appointor provided that in so 
doing the nominee director has an honest and reasonable belief that he or 
she is also acting in the best interest of the company. 
Crutchfield also identified the test, that is, provided the director has 
a bona fide belief that promoting the interests of his or her appointor is 
consistent with his or her own appreciation of the interests of the company 
and provided that that belief is not totally unreasonable, the nominee will 
not be in breach of fiduciary duty. This test has been adopted by the court 
in deciding whether the board as a whole has acted bona fide and in the best 
interest of the company. This brings the law and commercial reality together. 
Section 132(1E) [26] categorically states that a nominee director 
"shall act in the best interest of the company and in the event of any conflict 
between his duty to act in the best interest of the company and his duty to 
his nominator, he shall not subordinate his duty to act in the best interest 
of the company to his duty to his nominator." In short, nominee directors 
have to tread carefully with prudence and discernment. 
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Balan et al [27] too are of the view that S.132(1E) lists the categories 
of nominee directors. This list is wide enough to cover the usual kind of 
nominee director. The duty imposed by the new provision is similar to 
the duty under the common law. A point to note is that the new provision 
makes no exception. The strict rule seemingly applies even in the case of 
the director of a wholly owned subsidiary. However a possible but limited 
escape route is the wording of the section which is that a nominee director 
"shall not subordinate his duty to act in the best interest of the company 
to his duty to his nominator". Thus, it is arguable that he may, act in the 
interest of his nominator provided that his act also advances the interest of 
the company or does not conflict with his duty to the company. 
Lee [28] stated that the position of nominee director in Malaysia is that 
the phrase 'shall not subordinate his duty' under Section 132(1E) is worded 
in the negative. Therefore, as a final result, the company's best interest will 
prevail over the interest of the nominator. 
It is submitted that these commentators have agreed that [29] s.132 
(IE) CA 1965 places the position of nominee directors in Malaysia as 
illustrative of the strict or the traditional approach. The strict or traditional 
approach requires the nominee directors only to consider the best interest of 
the company and shall not subordinate his duty to act in the best interest of 
the company to his duty to his nominator. This strict or traditional approach 
has been discussed above as in the case of Industrial Concrete Products Bhd 
v Concrete Engineering Products Bhd [30]. 
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